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Abstract: This paper presents a Cabin Environment Physics Risk (CEPR) model that predicts the time 
for an initial failure of Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) functionality to 
propagate into a hazardous environment and trigger a loss-of-crew (LOC) event. This physics-of-
failure model allows a probabilistic risk assessment of a crewed spacecraft to account for the cabin 
environment, which can serve as a buffer to protect the crew during an abort from orbit and ultimately 
enable a safe return. The results of the CEPR model replace the assumption that failure of the crew-
critical ECLSS functionality causes LOC instantly, and provide a more accurate representation of the 
spacecraft’s risk posture. The instant-LOC assumption is shown to be excessively conservative and, 
moreover, can impact the relative risk drivers identified for the spacecraft. This, in turn, could lead the 
design team to allocate mass for equipment to reduce overly conservative risk estimates in a 
suboptimal configuration, which inherently increases the overall risk to the crew. For example, 
available mass could be poorly used to add redundant ECLSS components that have a negligible 
benefit but appear to make the vehicle safer due to poor assumptions about the propagation time of 
ECLSS failures. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Human space flight is not only extremely hazardous, but is also highly constrained in terms of mass, 
cost, and performance, making it an ideal candidate to benefit from risk-informed design [1]. Risk-
informed design practices enable spacecraft engineers to efficiently mitigate the most impactful risk 
factors while optimizing the use of constrained resources [2]. In other words, risk-informed design 
enables design teams to utilize precious resources, such as mass, in a risk-efficient manner to arrive at 
a risk-balanced design solution with a higher probability of success [3]. Implementing risk-informed 
design in human spaceflight requires the design team to have detailed, quantitative, probabilistic 
insights into the environmental hazards, operational risks, and component unreliabilities that could 
lead to a loss of mission (LOM) or a loss of crew (LOC) [4].  
 
Classical probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodologies based on event trees and fault trees 
cannot easily capture dynamic, time-sensitive interactions between a complex space system 
experiencing failure and the rapidly evolving hazardous environments that it encounters [5]. As such, a 
standard acceptable practice is to conservatively and simplistically bound the risk estimate by making 
assumptions about the time it takes a loss of functionality to propagate into a LOC event [6]. Often, it 
is assumed that loss of functionality immediately leads to LOC. However, if such an assumption 
causes the functionality to become a leading risk driver, then this assumption must be refined to allow 
the true nature of the system risk to emerge.  
 
Modeling risks due to Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) failures is an 
important example of this issue. It can be simplistically and conservatively assumed that a LOC event 
occurs immediately if ECLSS functionality is lost on a crewed spacecraft while in orbit. However, this 
assumption will be shown to be excessively conservative and dangerously misleading if the results are 
used to implement risk-informed design and guide the application of redundancy to various system 
functionalities. Such an assumption impacts the relative risk drivers identified by the assessment and 
could lead the design team to allocate mass to reduce risk in a suboptimal configuration, which 
inherently increases the overall risk to the crew. 
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 This paper presents a Cabin Environment Physics Risk (CEPR) model that uses physics-of-failure 
analysis to predict the time it takes for an initial ECLSS failure to propagate into a hazardous 
environment and cause a LOC event. This model allows the risk assessment to take credit for the cabin 
environment and diverse capabilities of the system, which can serve as buffer to protect the crew after 
an initial failure and enable a successful abort from orbit. This refinement removes the excessively 
conservative assumption that failure of a crew-critical ECLSS functionality causes LOC instantly and 
provides a more accurate picture of the spacecraft’s true risk posture. 
 
In the CEPR model, a functionality loss of varying severity occurs based upon a given failure initiator, 
triggering a LOM event. Once a LOM event has occurred, the model assumes that the mission ends 
early and the spacecraft performs contingency operations. The spacecraft aborts the nominal mission 
and attempts to return the crew safely before the failure can propagate into a LOC event. The severity 
of the failure and the resources available to mitigate it are used as inputs to the model. The model then 
captures the time- and state-dependent off-nominal performance of the system. 
 
The model tracks consumption of consumables; processing of cabin air by both the crew and 
atmospheric revitalizations subsystem (ARS) equipment; and the oxygen (O2), carbon dioxide (CO2), 
and nitrogen (N2) content of the cabin environment. The cabin environment is then compared to a 
physical threshold at which LOC would occur. Potential ECLSS failure modes include loss of air 
delivery to the cabin, a loss or reduction of CO2 removal from the atmosphere, and a loss of cabin 
pressure vessel integrity due to a valve or hatch failure. Specific mission Concept of Operations 
(ConOps) logic is encoded in the model to handle the various failure modes and respond in a manner 
that maximizes the amount of time until a LOC threshold of minimum O2 or maximum CO2 partial 
pressure is violated. 
 
The results of the CEPR model can be integrated into an overall dynamic mission risk model [7] to 
provide insight into the mission- and time-varying capabilities of a spacecraft to protect crew from an 
initial failure. It can also be utilized as a stand-alone model to aid in trade studies, ConOps 
development, and other design guidance. 
 
Future improvements to refine the model’s predictions and better reflect actual mission operations are 
also discussed, including stochastic initial cabin conditions, uncertainties in consumable gauging, and 
failure detection logic and timing. 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1.  Model Overview 
 
The CEPR model is an ongoing development with incremental stages of functionality included to 
address conservative, risk-driving assumptions that have been made during the development of the 
NASA Ames Research Center Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team’s generic spacecraft [8]. The 
PRA assessment presented was performed using the Ames Reliability Tool (ART), based upon 
previous ERA team efforts [9]. The ART is an implicit fault tree/event tree generator that can rapidly 
produce quantitative risk estimates by focusing only on the risk driving cut-sets and neglecting cross-
component interactions. Initial PRA estimates for the generic spacecraft indicated that ECLSS was the 
#2 LOC risk driver and that this risk was driven by the assumption that loss of ECLSS functionality 
leads immediately to LOC without the possibility of an abort from orbit. As such, the initial focus of 
the CEPR model development has been on ECLSS, with the ultimate goal of modeling the entire 
dynamic cabin environment. Currently, the scope of the CEPR model as described in this paper 
includes the functionality of the ECLSS pressure control subsystem (PCS), ARS, avionics, and the 
pressure vessel. Figure 1 shows a schematic of the current CEPR model scope, with connecting arrows 
indicating the external dependencies and resources supplied for each element. Future work aims to 
expand the model to include all physics-based interactions of the thermal control system (TCS), power 
systems, avionics, ARS, PCS, and crew activity cycles, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 Figure 1: Schematic of the current scope of the CEPR model. 
 
 
Figure 2: Schematic of the ultimate CEPR model concept goal. 
 
 
2.2.  Implementation 
 
The CEPR model has been implemented using the commercially available GoldSim software [10]. 
The model begins at the nominal, static, initial cabin environment conditions and simulates the system 
response to either an increased rate of cabin leakage, a decrease in CO2 scrubbing effectiveness, or a 
loss of access to either the N2 tank or O2 tank. The CEPR model tracks the quantity and mass flows of 
O2, CO2, and N2 both in the cabin environment and within the tanks.  
 
The mass of fluid in the cabin environment is converted to the partial pressures (pp) of each 
constituent using Equation 1, where P is the pressure or partial pressure, V is the volume of the cabin, 
n and R are physical constants, and T is the temperature of the cabin environment. 
 
 PV = nRT  (1) 
  
The simulation proceeds until a threshold specified by the minimum ppO2 or the maximum ppCO2 is 
reached, causing a LOC event. The amount of mission time for this to occur is the primary output of 
the model and allows for the consideration of off-nominal aborts from orbit that could return the crew 
safely before the onset of LOC. 
 
The avionics subsystem controls the system response by sensing the cabin environment and 
responding appropriately to maximize the use of onboard consumables and delay the onset of a LOC 
threshold. The avionics subsystem controls the mass flow rate of O2 into the cabin environment as 
needed to keep the ppO2 at the desired nominal set point, and controls the mass flow rate of N2 into the 
cabin environment as needed to keep the total pressure of the cabin environment at the nominal set 
point, unless an overboard leakage event is occurring and a lower set point is selected. If the ppCO2 
climbs above the set point, the system will inject extra N2 initially and then O2 (once N2 supplies are 
exhausted) to increase the total pressure of the cabin environment to just beyond the crack pressure of 
the positive pressure relief valve (PPRV). Once the PPRV is opened, the avionics subsystem stops 
injecting additional mass, and the PPRV vents the increased cabin pressure overboard to help remove 
CO2 from the cabin environment until the PPRV seal pressure is reached and the PPRV closes. The 
avionics subsystem then resumes injecting additional mass into the cabin in order to cycle the PPRV 
open-closed again and increase the amount of time before the ppCO2 reaches critical levels. 
 
2.3.  Design Details and Assumptions 
 
The model has been designed to be flexible enough to handle a variety of spacecraft configurations 
and designs. As such, design details must be known about the spacecraft in order to use the current 
model. Where design details are lacking, assumptions must be made about the design of the ERA 
spacecraft, which is the subject of the case studies presented in Sections 3 and 4. The design details 
pertain to cabin properties, initial nominal cabin state, the crew, and the capabilities of the PCS and 
ARS. The cabin properties are assumed to be 16 m3 of air volume at a constant 75 degrees Fahrenheit 
with no nominal leakage. The initial cabin state has 3.234 psi ppO2, 0.058 psi ppCO2, and 11.408 psi 
ppN2 [11]. The four-person crew is assumed to produce a constant 0.247 kg/hr of CO2 while 
consuming 0.235 kg/hr of O2 [12,13]. The oxygen tank contains 44.7 kg of O2 and the nitrogen tank 
contains 167 kg of N2 at the start of the mission. The lithium hydroxide CO2 scrubbers are assumed to 
be sized to remove exactly what the crew produces at 100% CO2 scrubbing effectiveness. The 
assumptions with the greatest impact on overall results are the LOC thresholds, which are 2.3 psi 
minimum ppO2 and 1.45 psi maximum ppCO2 [11,14]. In addition, simplifications have been made 
about the underlying physics represented in the model. It is assumed that any mass injected into the 
cabin environment will mix perfectly and that the sensing and control of the mass injection rates are 
perfect as well.  
 
2.4.  Integration into Dynamic Mission Risk Model 
 
The results of the CEPR model can be integrated into an overall dynamic probabilistic safety 
assessment (PSA) [7] to assess a spacecraft’s mission- and time-varying capabilities to protect crew 
from an initial failure. It can also be utilized as a stand-alone model to aid in trade studies, ConOps 
development, and other design guidance, which is later discussed in Sections 3 and 4. The dynamic 
PSA simulates individual Monte Carlo realizations of the mission in order to take into account the 
severity and probability of failure initiators, the expected time of failure, and other off-nominal events. 
Figure 3 shows a schematic of the conceptual data interface. Based on the mission elapsed time (MET) 
of the abort-initiating failure mode, a varying amount of consumables are left in the tanks. In addition, 
depending on the initiating failure mode, varying levels of severity contribute to the initial conditions 
of the CEPR model in order to determine how much time is available for the crew to successfully 
abort from orbit. 
 
 Figure 3: Conceptual integration interface. 
 
 
For the current CEPR model, three different time-to-LOC hazard tables have been created to capture 
the behavior of the system. Table 1 presents an example of one such table. The table indicates that, for 
example, if a 10 kg/hr cabin leakage were to occur at the very beginning of a Monte Carlo simulation 
realization, then the ERA spacecraft would need to complete the abort and return the crew safely 
within 5.88 hours in order to avoid a LOC. 
 
Table 1: Time-to-LOC hazard table for cabin leakage failure modes. 
 
 
 
3.  SENSITVITY CASE STUDIES 
 
To better demonstrate the capabilities of the CEPR model, several sensitivity case studies are 
presented using the ERA generic spacecraft design. These case studies show how the CEPR model can 
also be utilized as a stand-alone tool to aid in trade studies and ConOps development. 
 
 
 
 3.1.  Feed-the-Leak Sensitivity 
 
To investigate the sensitivity of available abort time to various leakage scenarios, the CEPR model 
was used to simulate the system response to overboard leakage failures of varying severity. The results 
enable assessment of the system’s ability to ‘feed-the-leak’ in order to maintain a habitable 
environment. The leakage rate was varied for each simulation along with the percent of onboard 
consumables remaining. The time-to-LOC results are shown in Figure 4. For this study, it was 
assumed that LOC would occur if the ppO2 reached 2.3 psi [11]. In addition, it was assumed that the 
worst-case return time (i.e., the longest potential abort from orbit) is 4 hours, which is indicated as a 
dotted red line in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Feed-the-leak sensitivity study results. 
 
 
The information in this study can be used to inform the intuition of the design team by quantifying the 
impact of several key cabin environment features. For example, with 0 kg/hr leakage and 0% 
remaining consumables, the ERA spacecraft is able to return home safely before LOC occurs. Such 
quantitative evidence could be used to enable the ERA spacecraft PRA to take credit for the cabin 
environment as an additional leg of redundancy. This could, in turn, impact a design decision to 
increase redundancy of the PCS. Moreover, such a detailed understanding of the system’s inherent 
capabilities could be used to enhance the margin and contingency policies for the ERA spacecraft. For 
example, if a design decision to increase the redundancy of the PPRV is considered, then the leakage 
rate for a failed-open PPRV can be calculated using the formula for choked flow of a compressible 
fluid through an orifice [15]. This formula is given in Equation 2, where ṁ is the mass flow rate, C is 
the coefficient of discharge, A is the area of the hole,  is the specific heat ratio of the gas,  is the 
density of the cabin air, and P is the pressure of the cabin air. 
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This equation yields that the expected leakage rate out of a quarter-inch PPRV will be approximately 
10 kg/hr. So, a loss of redundancy should not trigger an abort as long as at least 60% of the onboard 
consumables remain. Moreover, such an analysis indicates redundancy might not even be necessary 
since 88% of the consumables remain at the end of the nominal mission. 
 
 3.2.  CO2 Scrubbing Effectiveness Sensitivity 
 
To investigate the sensitivity of available abort time to CO2 scrubbing, the CEPR model was used to 
simulate the system response to varying reductions in CO2 scrubbing effectiveness. The percent 
scrubbing effectiveness was varied for each simulation along with the percent of onboard consumables 
remaining. Figure 5 shows the CEPR model’s time-to-LOC results. For this study, it was assumed that 
LOC would occur if the ppCO2 reached 0.87 psi [13]. In addition, it was conservatively assumed that 
the worst-case return time for an abort from orbit is 4 hours, which is indicated as a dotted red line in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Loss of CO2 scrubbing effectiveness sensitivity study results. 
 
 
This study demonstrates the system’s capabilities to “blow” additional mass into the system and 
trigger the PPRV to “bleed” excess cabin air into space. This blow-and-bleed functionality essentially 
allows the ERA spacecraft to return the crew safely even after a complete loss of CO2 scrubbing 
effectiveness, regardless of when the failure occurs, with varying levels of margin. Such knowledge 
would be extremely important to incorporate into the ERA spacecraft PRA to indicate that a loss of 
CO2 scrubbing functionality does not lead to LOC. Moreover, such information would have a definite 
impact on a design decision to increase the redundancy of the lithium hydroxide CO2 scrubbers and 
would also indicate that loss of lithium hydroxide CO2 scrubber redundancy should not trigger an 
abort from orbit. 
 
4.  RISK-INFORMED DESIGN EXAMPLE 
 
Implementing risk-informed design requires the design team to have detailed, quantitative PRA 
estimates. These risk estimates are important to informing the intuition of the design team regarding 
the relative impact of various risk-driving components. They are also extremely important to 
understanding the risk posture of the existing design and potential design enhancements in order to use 
risk as a metric during trade studies. The ERA spacecraft PRA was performed with the ART, based 
upon previous efforts [9]. This section presents an examination of the relative risk driver rankings and 
a potential risk reduction trade study. These risk-informed design examples illustrate how replacing 
the instant-LOC assumption with the CEPR model impacts both the overall risk driver rankings for the 
ERA spacecraft and the conclusions of a potential risk-reduction trade study. In this section, the 
dramatic differences in quantitative results due to the change in assumption will demonstrate that the 
conservative instant-LOC assumption is driving the risk of ECLSS and, thus, must be refined. 
  
4.1.  Relative Risk Drivers 
 
The ART-based PRA model of the ERA spacecraft was used to produce a list of spacecraft risk 
drivers, ranked by contributing subsystem. The ERA spacecraft subsystem risk drivers are shown in 
Table 2 for cases both with and without the results of the CEPR model included. Without the CEPR 
model, it is assumed that all ECLSS failures lead immediately to LOC, which causes ECLSS to appear 
as the #2 LOC risk driver. However, if the results of the feed-the-leak sensitivity study (Section 3.2) 
are combined with Equation 2 for each potential leak path, then this assumption can be refined and the 
LOC contribution of ECLSS drops dramatically to the #6 risk driver. This reduction in LOC risk with 
the CEPR model is due to the refined assumption that the cabin environment protects against LOC in 
99% of all cases, as opposed to 0% of cases without the CEPR model results included. This is still 
conservative, as the CEPR model indicates a 100% protection against LOC for these cases. This 
remaining 1% of risk is assumed to account for the difficulty of successfully implementing the off-
nominal procedures. 
 
Table 2: ERA spacecraft risk drivers. 
 
 
The dramatic change in relative risk driver ranking indicates that the subsystem LOC risk is being 
driven by the instant-LOC assumption, which the feed-the-leak sensitivity study indicates is extremely 
conservative. If an extremely conservative assumption is driving subsystem risk, then it must be 
refined in order to allow the true risk posture of the system to emerge and enable the design team to 
properly implement risk-informed design decisions. For example, if the lead designer of the ERA 
spacecraft wanted to allocate project resources to reduce the risk of LOC, then ECLSS would appear 
to be a prime candidate if CEPR model results were not included in the analysis. However, with the 
results of the CEPR model included, it would appear that electrical power or TCS would have a 
greater potential to improve the vehicle’s overall risk posture. This illustrates how including the CEPR 
model in the PRA provides more accurate design insights and helps the design team to effectively 
allocate program resources. 
 
4.2.  Risk Reduction Efficiency Trade Study Results 
 
In order to properly evaluate the relative benefits of potential design enhancements, the design team 
must have accurate relative risk estimates. One useful parameter for evaluating competing design 
enhancements is risk reduction efficiency (RRE), which is defined as the difference in risk between 
the trade study options divided by the difference in mass between the trade study options [3]. The RRE 
allows the design team to “get the most bang for their buck” or optimize their design decisions in 
terms of spending mass to buy down risk. 
 
 Table 3 shows the mass impacts of two different trade study design options to potentially buy down 
LOC risk by adding various components to the vehicle. The EPS – Enhanced option adds a fourth 
string of power generation capabilities, while the ECLSS – Enhanced option adds a redundant valve in 
series with every valve that could fail open and trigger an overboard leakage. 
 
Table 3: Trade study option mass summary. 
 
 
Table 4 shows the subsystem LOC risk estimates for the baseline design and the two enhanced 
options, computed both with and without the CEPR model assumptions included in the PRA, as 
discussed in Section 4.1. Without the CEPR model, the ECLSS – Enhanced option yields the higher 
RRE value and appears to offer a more efficient reduction of LOC risk per unit mass. However, when 
the results of the CEPR model are included, the EPS – Enhanced option has the higher RRE and 
provides significantly more risk reduction per unit mass. By incorporating the physics-of-failure for 
these potential leakage paths, it becomes immediately apparent that adding mass to reduce the risk of 
LOC from these valves is suboptimal due to the protection afforded by the cabin environment. If the 
CEPR model were not included in this trade study, then the design team would have used mass for 
equipment in a suboptimal configuration and would have effectively wasted several orders of 
magnitude of potential RRE, which instead could have been used to enhance the power system and 
reduce the overall risk of the vehicle. In this way, the design team would have actually increased the 
relative risk of LOC to the crew by not considering the physics-of-failure in the CEPR model. 
 
Table 4: Risk reduction efficiency of trade study options with and without CEPR model. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has described the use of the CEPR model to predict the time for an initial ECLSS failure to 
propagate into a hazardous environment and trigger a LOC. The model allows the risk analyst to 
replace the assumption that loss of functionality triggers LOC instantly and allows for a more accurate 
representation of the spacecraft’s risk posture. This assumption has been shown to be excessively 
conservative, as it greatly overstates the predicted LOC risk. Moreover, it has been shown that this 
assumption impacts the relative risk drivers of the spacecraft and could lead a design team to allocate 
mass in a suboptimal configuration, which inherently increases the overall risk to the crew for a given 
mass allocation.  
 
PRA estimates for additional LOC-risk-driving subsystems and components could also greatly benefit 
from a physics-based analysis of the propagation times between a loss of functionality and a LOC. 
Such modeling refinements must be undertaken to ensure more accurate relative risk comparisons. 
  
In the near future, risk-informed development of the CEPR model will continue to add system 
functionality, guided by the preliminary PRA of the ERA spacecraft. Specifically, the TCS will be 
added to the CEPR model in order to remove excessively conservative assumptions about the time-to-
effect of TCS failures in the spacecraft PRA. The power system will be included to better represent 
cascade failures and spacecraft abort performance during a degraded state. Stochastic initial conditions 
of the state of the cabin environment when failure occurs will be included to provide more insight into 
state uncertainty. In addition, failure detection logic and timing will be included to model actual 
mission operations more closely. Moreover, to better reflect the severity of various leakage failure 
modes in the dynamic PSA model, physics-based analysis will be undertaken to determine the amount 
of overboard cabin leakage for various failure modes, including meteoroid and orbital debris 
penetrations. 
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